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DANIEL BISCHOF Aarhus University, Denmark and University of Zurich, Switzerland
W
hether powerful media outlets have effects on public opinion has been at the heart of theoretical
and empirical discussions about the media’s role in political life. Yet, the effects of media
campaigns are difficult to study because citizens self-select into media consumption. Using a
quasi-experiment—the 30-year boycott of the most important Eurosceptic tabloid newspaper, The Sun, in
Merseyside caused by the Hillsborough soccer disaster—we identify the effects of The Sun boycott on
attitudes toward leaving the EU. Difference-in-differences designs using public opinion data spanning
three decades, supplemented by referendum results, show that the boycott caused EU attitudes to become
more positive in treated areas. This effect is driven by cohorts socialized under the boycott and byworking-
class voters who stopped reading The Sun. Our findings have implications for our understanding of public
opinion, media influence, and ways to counter such influence in contemporary democracies.
INTRODUCTION
A
re powerful media outlets able to shape public
opinion? This question is central to political
science and also extensively debated in other
disciplines (Bartels 1993; Horkheimer, Adorno, and
Noeri 1972; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948;
McQuail 1985; Mutz and Martin 2001; Zaller 1996).
The media’s role in influencing public opinion is conten-
tious, from both a normative and an empirical point of
view. While theorists have either attributed a crucial
information and enlightenment role to the media
(Holmes 1991) or warned about the media’s ability to
spread propaganda (Horkheimer, Adorno, and Noeri
1972; Lippman 1921), empirical political scientists have
questioned the media’s ability to shape public opinion.
Most prominently Klapper (1960) concluded that, if
anything, themedia have “minimal effects,” and this view
has been shared by other important scholars (Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). At best, some have argued,
media exposure should lead to the reinforcement of
existing attitudes (Sherrod 1971; Shrum 2002).
However, the relationship between media exposure
and public opinion is difficult to disentangle. Citizens
choose which media outlets they consume, and the
media not only set the agenda but also respond to
public opinion shifts (Baum 2002; Kinder 1998). The
“minimal effects” view has been forcefully challenged
(Zaller 1996). Lately, field experiments (Gerber, Kar-
lan, and Bergan 2009; King, Schneer, and White 2017)
and carefully designed observational studies
(Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011; Grossman,
Margalit, and Mitts 2020; Ladd and Lenz 2009) show
that exposure to newspapers can affect some electoral
behaviors (Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011;
Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan 2009; Ladd and Lenz
2009) and political discussion (King, Schneer, and
White 2017). However, there are fewer studies provid-
ing robust evidence that the media can change opin-
ions. Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009), which was the
only field experiment that attempted to test the effects
of randomly assigned newspaper subscriptions on
stated opinions, report null effects. However, the time
frame of their study is limited and it is difficult to speak
of “the media” and “media effects” as though we were
studying a homogeneous actor. Some TV stations and
newspapers, for instance the BBC or the Washington
Post, attempt to report news in a neutral or factual
manner, while other outlets explicitly try to “create
opinion” (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013): consistent
with this idea, quasi-random exposure to campaigning
outlets such as Fox News led to an increase in Repub-
lican vote shares (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Martin
and Yurukoglu 2017) and populist cable news in Italy
affected perceptions of crime rates (Mastrorocco and
Minale 2018).
In this study we show that a campaigning tabloid
newspaper was able to shape public opinion in the long
run, with potentially important policy consequences.
For causal identification, our study relies on a specific
historical event, the Hillsborough disaster, a human
crush at Hillsborough soccer stadium in Sheffield, Eng-
land, in 1989 inwhich 97Liverpool Football Club (F.C.)
supporters lost their lives.1 The biased and slanderous
reporting by theUK’s most popular tabloid newspaper,
The Sun, on the disaster and its victims led to an
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1 Initially, 96 people died in the disaster. This number was recently

























































































































unexpected and sudden boycott of The Sun in the
region of Merseyside (UK) covering Liverpool.
Importantly, for the purposes of this study, The Sun
also happens to be the most widely read Eurosceptic
newspaper in the UK and the second most widely read
newspaper in Europe (Campaign Magazine 2002).
Since the boycott was not triggered by the Eurosceptic
slant of The Sun, but by its extremely biased reporting
on the UK’s most deadly sporting disaster, the boycott
was not a function of EU attitudes in Merseyside.
We believe that our study makes several important
contributions to the literature on media effects, public
opinion, and the rise of Euroscepticism and has broader
implications for howwe understand the role of themedia
in contemporary democracies. The fact that this large-
scale boycott of the nation’s most widely read newspaper
has endured until the present day is a sufficiently large
and important event to allow us to estimate the effects of
a powerful medium on Euroscepticism, addressing the
concern that the effects of important causes are usually
extremely difficult to identify. Following individual atti-
tudes inMerseyside and otherNorthernEnglish counties
for more than 30 years, we provide evidence of the long-
term influence of sustained media campaigns on public
opinion. Using a difference-in-differences design based
on yearly British SocialAttitudes data from 1983 to 2004,
we show that The Sunboycott caused a sharp drop in Sun
readership inMerseyside.We also find that respondents’
attitudes toward theEUgot significantlymore positive in
Merseyside after the onset of the boycott compared with
attitudes of respondents in other Northern English areas
and in other areas of England as a whole. We substan-
tiate these findings by providing empirical evidence con-
sistent with the explanation that this decline in
Euroscepticism inMerseyside was driven by the boycott:
The decline in Euroscepticism was most pronounced
among cohorts that came of age during the boycott and
amongworking-class voters whoweremost likely to read
The Sun before the boycott. Moreover, we show that the
long-lasting “Sun” boycott negatively affected the
“Leave” vote in Merseyside during the 2016 EU refer-
endum. We thus provide evidence that long-term atti-
tudes toward the EU were influenced by media reports
and that the unfolding disintegration crisis of the EU is to
some extent a function of media campaigns that started
more than 30 years ago. While this might not be surpris-
ing to EU scholars, estimating the causal long-term effect
of aEuroscepticmedia campaign in a quasi-experimental
setting is a novel contribution.After all, theBritishBrexit
vote has beenoneof themost consequential public policy
decisions taken by referendum in the past decades.
MEDIA CAMPAIGNS AND
EUROSCEPTICISM
When theorists worry about the persuasive power of
the media, they usually refer to sustained one-sided
campaigns by a medium or multiple media outlets that
are meant to explicitly influence public opinion in a
specific direction (Horkheimer, Adorno, and Noeri
1972; Lippmann 1921). Media outlets can act as
“political actors” (Page 1985) and “issue
entrepreneurs” (de Vries and Hobolt 2020; Hobolt
and de Vries 2016), raising the salience of a specific
political issue while at the same time providing a strong
frame that citizens rely on to interpret the issue (Leeper
and Slothuus 2020). As Page (1985, 20) writes, we
should understand certain media outlets as political
actors who “try and change the beliefs and policy
preferences of mass and/or elite audiences, which
would presumably affect subsequent policy decisions.”
This assumes that these media outlets or their owners
act purposefully to influence public opinion and that
citizens can be receptive to such influences.
The latest experimental (Arceneaux and Johnson
2013; Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009; Broockman and
Kalla 2016) and quasi-experimental (Jäger 2020) litera-
ture on issue-based campaigns and framing effects
suggests that persuasion effects can materialize under
favorable scope conditions: when audiences are not
self-selecting into receiving political messages, but
receiving them as a by-product (Arceneaux and John-
son 2013), when campaigns target emerging rather than
highly salient or polarized issues (Arceneaux and
Kolodny 2009), and when messaging is one-sided or
loop-sided (Jäger 2020). As Zaller (1992) has shown,
messages should be more effective at influencing opin-
ions if the audience is not highly politically interested or
engaged. This leads to the apparent paradox that those
most likely to accept persuasive messages are least
likely to receive them (Zaller 1992). Building on these
insights, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) have argued
that audiences that consume a medium for entertain-
ment purposes should be more likely to change their
opinion if they receive political news via that medium
than audiences that consume the medium because they
intend to consume political news.
Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009) show that voters
changed their minds when exposed to messages on
birth control but not on the highly salient issue of
abortion. On highly salient issues, citizens will already
hold crystallized attitudes that are difficult to move.
This is consistent with findings by Gerber, Karlan, and
Bergan (2009) who report null effects of subscribing to
either the Washington Post or the Washington Times
on opinions toward the Iraq War in 2005. Clearly, Iraq
was a highly salient issue in the United States in 2005.
Moreover, the framing literature suggests that one-
sided messaging is particularly effective (Chong and
Druckman 2007). We should thus expect media effects
to materialize in political environments characterized
by one-sided messaging on emerging issues. We there-
fore deduct that if exposure to strong frames happens in
the absence of effective counter frames, the media
should be able to shape strong attitudes in relation to
an issue. As Chong and Druckman (2013, 13) write,
once “strong attitudes are accessible, counter-frames
are rejected and may even serve to reinforce the ori-
ginal attitude.” Strong attitudes are then difficult to
change going forward and will be less likely to decay.
One of the key remaining challenges in the study of
media effects is thus to identify the consequences of
sustained exposure to media content, so-called media

























































































































campaigns, on specific issues of policy importance. A
prime example of such a media campaign is the one-
sided negative coverage that the European Union
(EU) was subject to over three decades in the British
tabloid press (Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Jackson, Thor-
sen, and Wring 2016). While the EU issue in the 2010s
had become highly salient and during the EU referen-
dum campaign reporting was balanced, English voters
had been exposed to Eurosceptic content for decades
(Jackson, Thorsen, and Wring 2016; Levy, Aslan, and
Bironzo 2016). One remarkable aspect of this exposure
is that a lot of it happened inadvertently while consum-
ing tabloid media for their celebrity or sports coverage
(Rooney 2000).
Euroscepticmedia outlets and the reporters associated
with them had consistently portrayed European integra-
tion as a threat to sovereignty and theEUas an inflexible
and irrational bureaucracy imposing layers of red tape on
member states (Jackson, Thorsen, and Wring 2016).
While many researchers (de Vreese 2007; Hooghe and
Marks 2007) and columnists (Bennhold 2017; Martinson
2016) have wondered whether the tabloid press have
contributed to the riseofEuroscepticism—the (qualified)
rejection of European integration (de Vries 2018; Vasi-
lopoulou 2013), across Britain and otherEuropean coun-
tries—testing this claim is difficult. Researchers have
relied mostly on cross-sectional surveys (Carey and Bur-
ton 2004) or panel studies to control for time-invariant
confounders (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006). Sur-
vey-experimental studies suggest that there can be imme-
diate effects of Eurosceptic media frames on public
attitudes, for instance toward EU enlargement
(de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2011). Thus,
while there is evidence that media slant is correlatedwith
public attitudes and experiments show that Eurosceptic
frames and primes can have immediate effects in the
direction of the information, it remains unclear whether
sustained Eurosceptic media campaigns are able to con-
sequentially influence public opinion in the long run.
THE CASE: HILLSBOROUGH AND THE
MERSEYSIDE “SUN” BOYCOTT
To study such sustained media effects in a real-world
setting, we need to observe substantial and relatively
sudden change in media landscapes. Yet, media land-
scapes are normally relatively stable and change slowly;
on rare occasions media outlets enter or exit existing
media markets, offering opportunities to study the
effects of newspapers or TV channels on political out-
comes (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Gentzkow, Sha-
piro, and Sinkinson 2011). However, the decision to
enter or exit a media market can be endogenous to
political or economic considerations such as consumer
demand or the lack thereof (Gentzkow, Shapiro, and
Sinkinson 2011). Normally, media boycotts also follow
a political logic. We overcome this endogeneity con-
cern by relying on the case of the long-lasting “Mer-
seyside Sun boycott,” which was caused by an
exogeneous event, the Hillsborough sporting disaster
involving Liverpool F.C., and the ensuing slanderous
media coverage in The Sun tabloid, which led to a
geographically restricted boycott of the paper.
On April 15, 1989, Liverpool F.C. played Notting-
ham Forest in the semifinals of the British Football
Association (FA) Cup in the Hillsborough stadium.
Due to overcrowding and an ensuing mass panic,
97 Liverpool supporters lost their lives, hundreds were
injured, and thousands traumatized (Scration 2004;
Wright 1993; Wright, Gaskell, and O’Muircheartaigh
1998).2As pictured in Figure 1, The Sun’s sensationalist
coverage of the disaster was particularly one-sided and
falsely claimed that “the truth” about the disaster was
that Liverpool supporters were responsible for the
chaotic escalation, and ultimately, for their own death.
Based partly on false information by a South York-
shire police inspector, The Sun claimed that Liverpool
supporters had stolen from the dead as the disaster
unfolded. According to The Sun’s source, one of the
victims had “numerous wallets” on him, and was likely
“one of the Liverpool pickpockets.” Despite what
would turn into a commercial disaster for the paper,
The Sun remained unapologetic. This stubbornness led
to a boycott of The Sun in the Merseyside area. Soccer
is very important to Liverpudlians’ identities and to the
city of Liverpool (Alrababah et al. 2021). The Sun
boycott was initiated by football supporters and their
family and friends stopping purchasing the tabloid in
protest of The Sun’s coverage, and soon the boycott
was coordinated by the Hillsborough justice campaign
(BBC 2012). The boycott has not only been supported
by fans of Liverpool F.C., the most popular soccer club
in Merseyside, but even supporters of Premier League
rival Everton F.C. showed their solidarity with Liver-
pool supporters and the Hillsborough 97 and vouched
never to buy The Sun again. Until today, this boycott is
ongoing. In 2017 after speaking to several victims of the
Hillsborough disaster, the club owners and the man-
ager Jürgen Klopp decided to ban all “Sun” journalists
from entering their stadium at Anfield Road and their
training grounds (Conn 2017).
The Sun’s version of the Hillsborough disaster was
comprehensively contradicted by multiple reports
released by the official Hillsborough Independent
Panel, which pointed to the catastrophic mishandling
of the situation by the police (House of Commons
2012). The Guardian estimates that in the wake of the
Hillsborough disaster, The Sun’s circulation fell from
55,000 copies to just around 12,000 copies in Mersey-
side, although these figures cannot be independently
verified (Brook 2005).
Thus, to achieve valid and reliable information about
the extent of the boycott inMerseyside, we conducted a
telephone survey. More precisely, in January and
February 2021 we surveyed the entire population of
newsagents and cornershops located inMerseyside and
2 Half an hour before the scheduled start of the match, a large crowd
of predominantly Liverpool F.C. supporters gathered in front of the
stadium. Police officers decided to open the exit gates to let sup-
porters in. This uncontrolled in-streaming of ever more people led to
the overcrowding of the side pens (Jemphrey and Berrington 2000).

























































































































FIGURE 1. The Sun’s Hillsborough and EU coverage
Sources: British Newspaper Archive (British Library) and Woodhouse, Cole, and Pettit (2016).

























































































































two directly adjacent counties, Lancashire and Chesh-
ire, listed on Yelp where a functioning telephone num-
ber could be located either on Yelp or Google Maps.3
Newsagents were interviewed about newspaper sales,
with no reference to Hillsborough or The Sun boycott.
The results clearly confirm that The Sun boycott in
Merseyside is widespread. Overall, 62%of newsagents’
in Merseyside reported not selling The Sun. This figure
increases to 86% in the city of Liverpool. The survey
also shows that the boycott is clearly geographically
limited: 90% of newsagents in Lancashire and 88% of
newsagents in Cheshire report selling The Sun. Asked
about the number of copies of The Sun the newsagent
sold on an average weekday, 34% of newsagents who
did not sell The Sun mentioned the boycott
unprompted. One newsagent went on to explain:
You’re in Liverpool mate, not sure if you’re a football fan,
but no Scouser would dare read it. You might get the odd
one or two in the city, maybe the odd tourist, but that’s
about it. Ever since Hillsborough, nobody in this city
touches it.
“It’s Liverpool, innit?”was a common themewhen inter-
viewing newsagents’ about how many copies of The Sun
they sold. The top panel in Figure 2 displays the estimated
number of newspaper sales on an average weekday per
newsagent in Merseyside compared with adjacent coun-
ties. With an estimated six copies sold per newsagent per
day, sales inMerseysideareonlyaroundone thirdof those
in Cheshire and one fourth of those in Lancashire.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 then reports shops
boycotting The Sun in Merseyside according to a web-
page associated with the “Total Eclipse of the S*n”-
campaign. Both independent data sources provide
complementary information on the extent of the boy-
cott and show that the boycott is strong across Mersey-
side—strongest in its core—and does not significantly
extend to areas outside of Merseyside.
Even after The Sun’s unreserved apology in 2012
under the headline “Hillsborough: The real truth,”
which admitted that their reporting on Hillsborough
was the “gravest error” in the tabloid’s history and
acknowledged that “the people of Liverpool may never
forgive us for the injustice we did to them” (Moriarty,
Veevers, andDunn 2012), the boycott is ongoing to this
day (Conn 2017). In fact, a strong social norm of
boycotting The Sun developed in Merseyside. The
norm extends not only to boycotting the newspaper
itself but also to interviews by public figures such as
Merseyside MPs and celebrities who are publicly sanc-
tioned when breaking the norm (The Liverpool Echo
2011; Thorp 2018). Due to the UK’s reliance on news-
agents for newspaper sales, before the advent of the
Internet in the 2000s, norm violations were easy to
police and the initial boycott easier to enforce. Three
newsagents interviewed mentioned unprompted that
they were not selling the paper because they were
worried about customers’ reactions: “We stopped sell-
ing The Sun because we don’t want any trouble—
people were coming in and complaining.” One news-
agent reported that last time they tried selling The Sun,
people were “throwing things.” There is also evidence
that the boycott led to habit formation that lasted into
the Internet age. To get a better understanding of how
often people in Liverpool access The Sun online, we
report Googletrends data (more information: Appen-
dix A.1), which is available at the city level in England
from 2004 until today.
Googletrends displays the relative amount of
searches for a respective term, meaning that we can
not know how many people in Liverpool searched for
The Sun on Google but only the relative number in
relation to the region where most people searched
(Wolverhampton = 100%). In Liverpool we find by
far the lowest search amount in any British city, with a
30% search share. Even in urban, cosmopolitan areas
such as London, Oxford, or Cambridge the search
amount is still around 50%. Overall, this suggests we
have little reason to question that people fromMersey-
side bypass the boycott of The Sun or seek access to
The Sun via the Internet, even today.
The occurrence of the Hillsborough disaster, thus,
gives us the rare opportunity to identify the causal effect
of a sustainedmedia boycott on attitudes toward the EU
because the circulation of the most important Euroscep-
tic tabloid was significantly reduced due to a sporting
disaster, which was unrelated to the tabloid’s EU cover-
age.Readers did not choose to stop readingThe Sun due
to its EU coverage but due to a clear cause, which is
exogenous to The Sun’s anti-EU campaign. Thus, our
research design addresses the methodological issues of
selection and reverse causation discussed above.
THE SUN’S EU COVERAGE
The Australian-born media mogul Rupert Murdoch
bought the British newspaper The Sun in 1969 and
turned it into a “red top” tabloid paper (Rooney
2000), directly competing for readers with the Daily
Mirror, a title that dominated the tabloid market in the
UK in the 1960s and 1970s. The British newspaper
market can broadly be divided into two sections:
“Quality papers,” often referred to as “broadsheets,”
such as The Guardian and The Times, and “tabloids,”
which are defined by their sensationalist coverage and
eye-catching title pages. By the end of the 1970s, The
Sun had overtaken The Mirror as the most widely read
tabloid in the UK (Johansson 2007). In 1992, The Sun
had a daily circulation of around 3.6 million and was
read by around 10 million individuals (Rooney 2000).
At the end of the 1980s, The Sun and The Mirror
combined sold more copies than all other English
newspapers taken together (Johansson 2007).
However, in contrast to its main competitor, The
Mirror, The Sun took a strong negative editorial stance
on the European Union during the 1990s and 2000s
(see FigureA.4 and FiguresA.5 in theAppendix for the
number of articles and proportion of editorials that
3 The response rate to the telephone survey was 25% for an overall
sample of N = 165. More details can be found in Appendix A.1.

























































































































contain EU-specific search terms). As Nigel Farage
commented in a recent BBC interview, “I think Mur-
doch helped to create an environment in which Brexit
could happen with the Sun’s pretty constant Euroscep-
tic criticism” (Roberts 2020).
In Table 1 we display a comprehensive content
analysis of a random sample of editorials published in
The Sun and The Mirror that contained search terms
associated with the “European Union.”4Between 1996
and 2016, the period for which editorials are available
in the Factiva database, 92% of The Sun’s editorials
displayed a negative tone toward European integration
and 80%were classified as “Eurosceptic,” based on the
definition by Vasilopoulou (2013) provided to coders
(see Appendix A.3.1). This overwhelmingly negative
slant of The Sun compares with the relatively neutral to
positive slant that is visible in The Daily Mirror
throughout the same period. Only 10% of TheMirror’s


































































Note: Top: Average number of papers sold per newsagent per county (source: original newsagents telephone survey, N = 165 shops);
whiskers show 95% confidence intervals. Bottom: Location of boycotting shops (source: https://totaleclipseofthesun.org/shops).
4 The search terms used were “EU,” “European Union,” “European
Community,” “European Commission,” “Brussels,” “EURO,” and
“Europe,” excluding terms associated with sports competitions, fash-
ion, music, and travel.

























































































































editorials were classified as “negative” in tone toward
European integration by coders and only 6% could be
classified as “Eurosceptic.”5
While The Sun’s Online Archive only starts in 1996,
in Appendix Figure A.8 we present qualitative evi-
dence that The Sun’s Eurosceptic coverage was pro-
nounced around the time of the Hillsborough disaster
in the early 1990s when the paper opposed then Com-
mission President Jacques Delors in his feud with
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher about fur-
ther European integration, British participation in
monetary union, and British contributions to the EC
budget. Now famous articles and editorials from 1989
and 1990, the period directly following the Hillsbor-
ough disaster, are shown in Figure 1 and A.8 in the
Appendix.
Moreover, The Sun became famous for inventing
and spreading so-called Euromyths, some of the most
famous being that Brussels was trying to ban “bendy
bananas” and regulate the shape of cucumbers (see
FigureA.9 in theAppendix for a famous Sun story). All
stories portray EU bureaucrats as out-of-touch and
trying to impose unnecessary red tape on Britain. The
persistence of Euromyths among the British public was
a problem important enough that the European Com-
mission dedicated an entire website to debunking these
myths during the 2016 EU referendum campaign
(Hobolt and Tilley 2014). While there are other Euro-
sceptic papers in the UK, notably the Daily Mail and
the Daily Telegraph, The Sun has by far the highest
circulation numbers. As Figure A.2 in the Appendix
shows, in 1992 The Sun had around 3.6 million readers
compared with the Mail’s 1.7 million readers and the
Telegraph’s 1 million readers. Moreover, the class
appeal of Eurosceptic papers in the UK is markedly
different. The Sun’s readership is significantly more
working class than the readership of other papers
(Ladd and Lenz 2009; Rooney 2000; see also
Figure A.15 in the Appendix). During most of the
period we study, The Sun supported the Conservative
party under Margaret Thatcher (PM from 1979–1990)
and John Major (PM from 1990–1997). While the
tabloid switched support to New Labour under Tony
Blair and Gordon Brown from 1997 until the 2010
General Election, it remained steadfast in its Euroscep-
tic slant and anti-EU coverage throughout UK
Labour’s last period in office (Ladd and Lenz 2009;
Roberts 2020).
The Sun was a major media player in the EU refer-
endum campaign of 2016 when it forcefully advocated
for a “Leave” vote (see Figure A.7). A comprehensive
analysis of EU referendum media coverage shows that
The Sun was classified as one of only two papers in the
UK (the other being the Daily Mail) that was both
Eurosceptic in its positioning and had a large reach and
volume, meaning it was read by a large proportion of
the electorate (Levy, Aslan, and Bironzo 2016, 17).
Importantly, The Sun published more than twice as
many articles on the referendum than the second most
important tabloid, the Mirror, which took a pro-EU
stance (Levy, Aslan, and Bironzo 2016, 12). Emphasiz-
ing the papers’ perceived contribution to Brexit, the
editor of The Sun, Tony Gallagher, texted the Guard-
ian Newsroom on the morning after the referendum
with the words “So much for the waning power of the
print media” (Martinson 2016).
RESEARCH DESIGN
The unexpected occurrence of the Hillsborough disas-
ter allows us to estimate the causal effect of a wide-
spread, but geographically restricted, boycott of the
most important Eurosceptic tabloid newspaper in the
UK, caused by a plausibly exogenous event, on atti-
tudes toward leaving the EU. In our framework, all
parliamentary constituencies that happen to be located
within Merseyside county would be assigned to treat-
ment, the tabloid boycott. Our main analyses are there-
fore “intent-to-treat” analyses. We conceptualize the
boycott as a large number of shops refusing to sell the
paper and a majority of citizens refusing to read The
Sun. Both dynamics are strongly and positively correl-
ated. In our data we do not observe evidence consistent
with a displacement mechanism: shops in Merseyside
TABLE 1. Editorial Slant of the Sun and the Mirror, 1996–2016
The Sun The Mirror % agreement Kappa Pearson’s r
% EU 56.9 49.4 83.6 0.67
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
N 610 352 481 481
% negative 91.6 10.3 92.3 0.83
0–100 negativity scale 62.0 41.3 0.75
% Eurosceptic 80.1 6.3 76.9 0.55
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
N 347 174 221 221 200
5 A detailed discussion of the methodology, the intercoder reliability
of the measures and instructions given to coders are available in
Appendix A.3.1. Due to national lockdown restrictions due of
COVID-19, we were unable to extend the content analysis to the
years from 1983–1995. The Sun’s online archive is only available from
1996 onward and the British Library, which has archived all editions
of The Sun on microfilm in London, was closed during two national
lockdowns in England.

























































































































that continue to sell The Sun do not sell more copies
than shops in places where the boycott is not oper-
ational. In auxiliary analyses we therefore measure the
extent of today’s boycott via two distinct but comple-
mentary proxies: the number of stores that participate
in the boycott according to a list provided on the “Total
Eclispe of the S*n” campaign website that we scraped
from the Internet and geolocated within parliamentary
constituencies6 and based on the proportion of shops
boycotting The Sun as recorded in our newsagents
survey.
Given the strong anti-EU stance of The Sun, we
expect that due to the boycott induced by the Hillsbor-
ough disaster, Euroscepticism should decrease in Mer-
seyside compared with a counterfactual where
Hillsborough would not have happened. To construct
this credible counterfactual, we rely on a difference-in-
differences design (DiD) (Angrist and Pischke 2009;
Dunning 2012), assuming that Euroscepticism in Mer-
seyside would have continued on a similar trend to the
rest of Northern England were it not for The Sun
boycott directly induced by the newspaper’s libellous
reporting on the Hillsborough disaster.
Estimation
To estimate the DiD, we allocate respondents to the
treatment group if they reside in parliamentary con-
stituencies within Merseyside and to the control group
if they reside in the remaining Northern English par-
liamentary constituencies. The reason that we define
other Northern English constituencies as the control in
our main specification is that they were subject to
similar macroeconomic and socioeconomic trends over
period that we study (Wilks-Heeg 2003). Regions such
as London and the South of England had seen faster
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s than the North
of England. Note, however, that our findings are robust
to including all of England as a control group
(Appendix A.7).
We apply a two-way fixed effects specification, which
allows us to adjust for any time-constant differences
across constituencies:
leavingEUi,c,t ¼ αc þ γt þ δDIDTc,t þ εi,c,t, (1)
where Leaving EUi,c,t is respondent i’s support for
leaving the EU in constituencyc at yeart; αc is a con-
stituency fixed effect that rules out omitted variable
bias from unobserved constituency characteristics that
are invariant over our study period; γt are time fixed
effects (year, quarter) that control for common factors
changing across time; Ti,c,t is our binary treatment
indicator, that equals 1 for Merseyside after the
Hillsborough disaster; and εi,c,t is the error term. The
term δDID is the estimand of interest, which identifies
the effect of Hillsborough on Euroscepticism in Mer-
seyside. Because the sampling frame of the survey is
stratified by constituency, we cluster our standard
errors at the constituency level.7
As a robustness test, we use constituency-specific
linear time trends instead of the simpler constituency
and time fixed effects specification, outlined above.
The model we estimate is as follows:
leavingEUi,c,t ¼ αc þ γt þ αc  γt þ δDIDTc,t þ εi,c,t : (2)
This allows treatment and control constituencies to
follow different trends (Angrist and Pischke 2009,
238). Furthermore, we conduct analyses using alterna-
tive sample compositions (Appendices A.6 and A.7),
investigate potential spillover effects to adjacent con-
stituencies (Appendix A.8), conduct placebo tests
(Appendix A.9), use matching techniques (Appendix
A.10), and provide additional information and data
that helps us appreciate the exclusion restriction to
further substantiate the robustness of our empirical
findings.
Our attitudinal analyses are based on the long-run-
ning and high-quality British Social Attitudes (BSA)
Survey—an annual cross-sectional survey of public
opinion toward social and political issues in Britain
(National Centre for Social Reserach 2004).8 We rely
on the BSA Survey because it is the only survey in the
UK that covers a sufficiently long period before and
after the Hillsborough disaster and provides informa-
tion about the location of the interview at the constitu-
ency level. We cover the years from 1983 to 2004, the
last year in which parliamentary constituency identi-
fiers are included in the BSA, allowing us to match
respondents to the area in which they live. From 2005
onward, the BSA no longer includes any location
6 According to the website, there are shops that participate in the
boycott and are not located in Merseyside. We also geolocate these
shops in their corresponding parliamentary constituencies. We use
this measure as an alternative specification of the treatment in our
DiD framework (see Appendix Table A.11) and as the endogenous
variable in a 2SLS regression reported in Appendix Table A.12.
7 Clustering can follow two types of logic: sampling. or assignment
(Abadie et al. 2017). The BSA followed a two-stage sampling pro-
cess, where a subset of constituencies was randomly sampled from the
population of all constituencies in the first stage and respondents
were sampled randomly from the sampled constituencies in the
second stage. Thus, there are constituencies in the population that
we do not see in the sample and we should therefore cluster at the
constituency level. Clustering can also be driven by design consider-
ations: one might argue that the treatment is assigned at the county
level and that we should therefore cluster our standard errors at that
level. We do so in Appendix A.11. Our conclusions remain
unaffected by this decision. Because we have fewer than 50 counties
in our data, standard errors are biased downward when clustering at
the county level. We address this issue by applying a wild bootstrap
(Esarey and Menger 2019).
8 The yearly BSA survey data are available from the UK Data
Service: https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/series/ser
ies?id=200006. NatCen who conduct the BSA do not allow
researchers to deposit replication datasets. On the APSR Dataverse
(https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NYPOQD) we provide the complete
code required to build the dataset for analysis, based on the original
datasets stored with the UKDS, and to reproduce all tables and
figures in the text, appendices, and online supplementary informa-
tion. We also provide the full replication data and code to reproduce
all other analyses in the paper.

























































































































identifiers smaller than the subregion.9 Of the 35,204
BSArespondents, 908 live inone of the 15parliamentary
constituencies within Merseyside and were directly
exposed to the “Sun” boycott.10Wemeasure Euroscep-
ticism by relying on the question asking respondents
whether “Britain should continue its EEC/EU
membership.” Our dependent variable Leaving EU is
then coded 1 if respondents answered that Britain
should withdraw from/leave the EEC/EU and 0 other-
wise.11 As we use the BSA Euroscepticism
measurement instrument over a 30-year period, con-
cerns over measurement error linger. In Appendix A.4
we validate the measurement instrument by reporting a
strong correlation between national trends in Euroscep-
ticism as recorded in the BSA and the most frequently
used measure based on Eurobarometer data.
Because we are dealing with repeated cross-sectional
data,we control for respondents’ gender, age, education,
ethnicity, self-reported social class, and party identifica-
tion. As the BSA reports the interview dates for each
respondent, we can directly identify which respondents
were interviewed before and after the 19th of April 1989
—the day The Sun published its first of several slander-
ous front pages on the Hillsborough Disaster.
RESULTS
Figure 3 shows the results of the manipulation check,
the effect of Hillsborough on self-reported print media
consumption among respondents sampled in parlia-
mentary constituencies locatedwithinMerseyside com-
pared with that of respondents sampled from the
remaining parliamentary constituencies located in the
North of England. The Sun does not release circulation
data at the county level or below, so we are unable to
estimate the effects of the Hillsborough disaster on
actual “Sun” readership in Merseyside. While self-
reports can be a function of social desirability bias, in
this case this would confirm the existence of a strong
social norm against reading The Sun in Merseyside.
















-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Difference in proporon of self-reported newspaper readership post vs. pre boyco
Note: Control (top row) includes all Northern English counties except Merseyside; changes in predicted probabilities derived from
multinomial logistic regression surrounded by 95% confidence intervals.
9 We also considered using Eurobarometer data (EB), the British
Household Panel Study (BHPS), and the British Election Study
(BES). While providing excellent information on Euroscepticism,
theEBdoes not provide any geolocations prior to 1990 and theBHPS
only started in 1991. The BES 1987–1992 panel study would allow us
to investigate two years, 1987 and 1992, but there are only 46 respond-
ents interviewed inMerseyside post-Hillsborough. All of these short-
comings make it either impossible to use these data sources (EB,
BHPS) or less useful than the BSA (BES).
10 Several covariates have missing values for respondents. We mean-
impute all missing values in the analyses reported below; our findings
are robust to excluding all missing observations (see Online Supple-
mentary Information section S.2).
11 From 1983—1992, 0 comprises “continue” and “don’t know.”
From 1993 onward, the BSA introduced six answer categories to
the same question: “uk leave ec” (coded as 1), “stayþreduce ec
power,” “leave as is,” “stayþincr.ec power,” “single ec govt,” and
“don’t know” (all coded as 0). Because this change in the measure-
ment instrument does not coincide with the treatment and happens in
both treatment and control areas, it should not violate the exclusion
restriction. All results are robust to excluding the 1993–2004 period
and to an alternative specification of the dependent variable where
“stayþreduce ec power” is also coded as 1.

























































































































Figure 3 compares changes in self-reported news-
paper readership in Merseyside post- versus pre-Hills-
borough (row B) with change in readership in other
Northern English counties (row A). The changes in
predicted probabilities derived from the multinomial
logistic model that is plotted in Figure 3 can be directly
interpreted in percentage points, meaning that post-
Hillsborough, “Sun” readership inMerseyside declined
by 11 percentage points compared with no change
(a precisely estimated 0 percentage points) in other
Northern English counties. To be precise, self-reported
Sun readership among respondents living in parliamen-
tary constituencies within Merseyside decreased from
18 to 7%.
Note also that Figure 3 shows a substitution effect of
“Sun” readership to pro-EU papers, coded as Daily
Mirror, Independent, Guardian, the Financial Times,
and The Times12 instead of substitution to anti-EU
newspapers (Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Daily Star,
and Daily Express). Crucially, The Daily Mirror
becomes by far the most popular national paper in
Merseyside post-Hillsborough. This is reflected in both
the self-reported readership data and the newsagents
survey. Based on the BSA, among newspaper readers,
26% report reading The Mirror. Readership of all
other pro-EU papers combined is only 6%. Moreover,
based on the newsagents survey we estimate that the
Mirror sells an average of 34 copies per newsagent daily
inMerseyside, whereas the number is half that figure in
the adjacent counties of Cheshire and Lancashire. Sub-
stitution from The Sun to The Mirror is plausible
because many readers consume The Sun based on its
cultural appeal and sports coverage, which is most
closely reflected by The Mirror, not The Daily Mail
or The Daily Telegraph (Johansson 2007; Rooney
2000). As Rooney (2000, 107) writes, The Sun and
The Mirror “both thought the same readership, they
both eschewed the serious in favor of the nonserious.
Central to their editorial agendas was the pursuit of the
sensational.” While The Sun’s and The Mirror’s read-
ership bases are mostly working class, the Mail’s and
the Telegraph’s bases are (lower) middle class. While
the DiD analyses that follow will not allow us to
empirically distinguish between the effects of nonrea-
dership of Eurosceptic material in The Sun and poten-
tial substitution with pro-EU material in The Mirror
during the 1990s and early 2000s, which is the period
covered by the public opinion data, in contrast to The
Sun, The Mirror published very few editorials pertain-
ing to European integration (Figure A.4 in the Appen-
dix). In fact, The Mirror published only one editorial
that included keywords relating to European integra-
tion in the years between 1996 and 2000 compared with
The Sun, which published 62 editorials over the same
period. Also, 92% of the “Sun” editorials showed a
negative slant toward the EU. Therefore, we think that
it is highly unlikely that the drop in Euroscepticism that
we observe as a function of the boycott was in large part
due to the Mirror’s pro-EU coverage as opposed to the
absence of The Sun’s Eurosceptic content.
Figure 4 plots the percentage of respondents who
support leaving the EEC/EU sampled from parliamen-
tary constituencies within Merseyside and the control
group consisting of respondents living in all remaining
constituencies in the North of England, along with a
dashed line projecting counterfactual trends inMersey-
side. We estimate this counterfactual by relying on the
trends in the control group to extrapolate the trends for
Merseyside. Because sample sizes are small for some
years, we always pool two successive years in this
figure. Before the Hillsborough disaster, respondents’
opinions sampled withinMerseyside constituencies fol-
lowed parallel trends on Euroscepticism to opinions of
respondents sampled in other Northern parliamentary
constituencies. These parallel pretrends give credibility
to the assumption that in the absence of the Hillsbor-
ough disaster, respondents in Merseyside would have
followed opinion patterns in Euroscepticism similar to
those in the rest of Northern England. There are many
similarities between Merseyside and the remaining
North of England (e.g., voting patterns).13 Although
we estimate that Merseyside was more Eurosceptic
before Hillsborough, during the boycott we estimate
that attitudes toward EU membership in the early
1990s became significantly more positive in Mersey-
side, compared with the counterfactual, and stayed
more positive throughout the entire posttreatment
period.
Table 2 reports the main findings of the formal DiD
models. All models use the DiD strategy outlined
above. The first model reports a simple bivariate com-
parison, and the following two models add fixed effects
for constituencies, year (2) and months (3), respect-
ively. Model (4) then adds all control variables listed
above. Models (5) and (6) then introduce interactive
fixed effects. Because some covariates are not recorded
in the years before 1985 (e.g., education) the main
findings are based on the years 1985–2004. Our findings
are entirely robust to the inclusion of the entire time
span (Appendix A.6).
Throughout all models in Table 2, we estimate a
theoretically meaningful, large effect of Hillsborough
on respondents’ attitudes toward leaving the EEC/EU
in Merseyside. Depending on the models we estimate,
the effects range from a 7- to 17-percentage-point
decrease in Euroscepticism. Our preferred model,
model 6, reports an 11-percentage-point decrease in
Euroscepticism. Thus, we find a statistically significant
and substantially meaningful decline in Euroscepticism
due to The Sun boycott following Hillsborough. Note
that effect sizes and significance levels are comparable
across models 2–6 once we add more fixed effects,
covariates, and constituency-specific time trends. It is
12 There is some ambiguity about The Times’s position. The Times
endorsed “Remain” in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Reclassifying
The Times as a Eurosceptic paper does not change the results.
13 InAppendixA.7 we specify all remainingEnglish constituencies as
the control group. Although the pretrends diverge slightly between
1983 and 1984 in this specification, our findings remain entirely
robust.

























































































































important to note that most of the decline in Euroscep-
ticismoccurs between 1989 and 1994, exactly at the time
when The Sun made its first big stand on European
integration, vehemently opposing, ridiculing, and
deriding then Commission President Jacques Delors
and Britain’s adaption of the ECU, the predecessor of
theEURO.Articles and editorials from the crucial 1989
and 1990 period are displayed in Appendix A.3.2.
The analyses presented here do not yet incorporate
the extent of the boycott. To do so, we rely on the web-
FIGURE 4. Trends in Euroscepticism in Merseyside and Control Counties before and after
Hillsborough




























1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
year
Merseyside Control: North Merseyside (counterfactual)
TABLE 2. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Hillsborough-Induced Sun Boycott on
Euroscepticism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Support leaving the EU (0,1)
δ DiD –0.070 –0.172 –0.170 –0.166 –0.120 –0.114
(0.016) (0.047) (0.049) (0.044) (0.032) (0.033)
Constant 0.212 0.219 0.219 0.231 0.215 0.220
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.002) (0.029)
Constituency FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Quarter FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Constituency FE  year ✓ ✓
Constituency FE  quarter ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Obs 10,384 10,384 10,384 10,384 10,384 10,384
Nconstituencies 172 172 172 172 172 172
Adj. R2 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08
Adj. R2 (within) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
RMSE 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39
Note: Period: 1985–2004. Clustered standard errors by constituency. Controls: age, gender, education, religion, social class, party-ID.
Constituency and time fixed effect estimates omitted from table.

























































































































scraped information on boycotting shops along with
our telephone survey of newsagents to estimate the
extent of the boycott across English constituencies
and counties. InAppendixA.13, we use thesemeasures
to reestimate our DiD model, first using the extent of
the boycott as measured by the logged number of
boycotting shops per constituency scraped from the
“Eclispe of the S*un” website and, second, based on
an instrumental variable approach. We use the number
of boycotting shops per county as the endogenous
variable and location within Merseyside post-Hillsbor-
ough as the exogenous instrument, and second we use
the proportion of boycotting shops per county as esti-
mated based on the newsagents survey as the endogen-
ous variable. In both instances we distinguish between
the city of Liverpool and other places in Merseyside to
account for the essential geographical variation in the
strength of the boycott.14 Our findings are robust to
both 2SLS specifications.
We also report further tests in the Appendix. First,
we report the results using respondents sampled in all
remaining English parliamentary constituencies as the
control group. Reestimating the DiD models does not
change our findings (Appendix A.7). Second, we inves-
tigate whether there are spillover effects into counties
adjacent to Merseyside. Spillover effects could imply
that we underestimate the effect of reading The Sun on
Euroscepticism because in the models reported in
Table 2 these constituencies are part of the control
group. However, we do not find a pattern of effects
that would be consistent with large spillover into adja-
cent areas (Appendix A.8). This is consistent with the
results from our newsagents survey, which show that
the boycott is geographically limited to Merseyside.
Third, the negative effect of the boycott on Eurosceptic
attitudes might, at least in part, be a function of an
increase in “don’t know” responses in Merseyside and
could mask a smaller movement away from “Leave.”
Yet, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there was
no effect of the Sun boycott on “don’t know” responses
to the Euroscepticism question. Appendix A.5 shows
point estimates ranging from þ1.6 to -4.6 percentage
points, but none of these estimates is significantly
different from zero and their size cannot account for
the large media effects reported in Table 2. While we
cannot identify individual-level mechanisms with
repeated cross-sectional data, the observed patterns
would be consistent with substantial movement from
“Leave” to “Remain.” Fourth, the decrease of Euro-
scepticism might not be unique to Merseyside, but
subject to a more general pattern across English con-
stituencies. Therefore, we randomly reassigned the
treatment into other parliamentary constituencies in
England using a (permutation test) and find that the
drop of Euroscepticism in parliamentary constituencies
located within Merseyside is statistically distinct from
the simulated sample of estimates (Appendix A.9).
Fifth, we used matching on observables to address
issues of comparability between treatment and control
group across space and time. Again our findings remain
robust (Appendix A.10). Sixth, we reestimate the DiD
clustering at the county level and including county-level
fixed effects. The results remain consistent (Appendix
A.11).
Excludability
For our results to be valid, we need to assume that
Hillsborough in April 1989 did not coincide with any
other significant event or phenomenon of similar
importance that differentially applied to Merseyside
compared with other Northern English counties and
could (to a large extent) explain the large decline in
Euroscepticism in Merseyside that we observe com-
pared with control areas. This assumption is often
summed up as the “no compound treatment
assumption.” There are three alternative develop-
ments, an increase in Labour Party support under Tony
Blair during the 1990s and 2000s, an increase in EU
structural funds to Merseyside, and deindustrialization
due to globalization, that could potentially provide
threats to inference. In what follows, we provide evi-
dence that we think helps us appreciate the validity of
the excludability assumption.
First, during the mid 1990s and early 2000s, the UK
saw a decline in Conservative party support and a shift
to the Labour Party, first lead by Neil Kinnock, then by
the late John Smith, and from 1994 onward, by Tony
Blair. Thanks to its industrial heritage and radical
political tradition (including the Militant tendency),
by the late 1980s Merseyside was a bastion of the UK
Labour Party. Importantly, by 1983, the beginning of
our time-series data, the Labour Party had decisively
abandoned its Euroscepticism under its socialist leader
Michael Foot (1979—1983), and both the pretreatment
1987 and the posttreatment 1992 Labour Party mani-
festos authored under Neil Kinnock’s leadership con-
sistently committed Labour to staying in the EEC.
Recall that for the DiD to be valid, trends need to be
parallel, not levels. Consistent with the excludability
assumption, a study of Merseyside politics by Wilks-
Heeg (2018) finds that an increase in Labour Party
support occurred in the 1980s, and then again after
2010. Beyond this qualitative illustration, we try to
address any remaining concerns empirically in our
matching approach in Appendix A.10, where wematch
respondents in treatment and control on party identifi-
cation. We show that our results are robust to including
party identification (which is plausibly endogenous) as
one of the variables we match on.
Second, during the 1990s Merseyside was named a
priority region for the receipt of EU structural funds
(Objective 1 spending) by the UK government led by
Conservative Prime Minister John Major. Thus, an
increase in EU structural funds above what other
14 Since we are unable to go back in time, we only hold information
about the extent of the boycott as of today. For our 2SLS specifica-
tion, we need to make the assumption that the boycott began in 1989
and that the geographic variation of the boycott (between Liverpool
and other places in Merseyside, and between Merseyside and other
counties) was stable over time. While this corresponds to an approxi-
mation, we think that the relative strength of the boycott across
counties is unlikely to have differed systematically.

























































































































Northern counties received could potentially provide
an alternative explanation for our findings. However,
Merseyside was only dedicated a priority region for EU
structural funds from 1994 onward, for the 1994–1999
funding round (Di Cataldo 2016). Before that, for the
crucial 1988–1993 funding round that directly coincides
with Hillsborough, Merseyside benefited from struc-
tural funds equally with other Northern counties.
Figure 4 clearly shows that the largest drop in Euro-
scepticism in Merseyside occurs in the early 1990s, not
in the mid 1990s, which would have pointed to some
influence of EU structural funds. This assumption is
also consistent with a recent paper using a RDD to
identify the effects of EU structural funds on Euro-
scepticism, which reports null effects (Schüssler 2019).
Third, previous scholarship contends that globaliza-
tion shocks contribute to explaining the recent success
of challenger parties (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013)
and the rise in Eurosceptic attitudes (Colantone and
Stanig 2018). If Merseyside was affected differently by
globalization at the exact time as The Sun boycott
occurred, this might explain the decline of Euroscepti-
cism. In this context it is important to note that Liver-
pool was worst hit by deindustrialization in the 1970s
and the early 1980s (Wilks-Heeg 2003) and that the
economic revival of the region did not start in the early
1990s. Liverpool’s population continued to decline
(albeit at a lower pace) until 2001, and economic
growth only returned in the 2000s (Wilks-Heeg 2003;
Jones and Wilks-Heeg 2004). Moreover, in Appendix
A.12 we merge the BSA data with information about
the “offshorability” of respondents’ jobs—a valid
approximation for individuals’ economic affectedness
by globalization (see Mahutga, Curran, and Roberts
2018)— and control for “offshorability,” and our find-
ings remain unaffected.
Mechanisms
To further understand which subpopulations drive our
global finding, we rely on a set of difference-in-differ-
ence-in-differences (DiDiD) designs. Doing so allows
us to better understandwhichmechanisms could poten-
tially explain the main findings reported above.
First, we investigate how the boycott of The Sun
affected generations that were socialized into politics
while the boycott was ongoing. Research on political
socialization posits that political identities tend to
develop in younger age and frequently remain fairly
stable across the life cycle (Dinas 2013). These “forma-
tive years” are described as a laboratory in which ideas
are exchanged, challenged, dropped, and renewed.
Applied to our case at hand, this might mean that
people going through their formative years during the
boycott (a) might be more likely to support the boycott
and, thus, (b) be more supportive of the EU due to the
absence of The Sun’s Eurosceptic slant. In contrast,
both effects should beweaker for people who were past
their formative years when the boycott started.
To test this idea we coded all respondents as “experi-
encing their formative years during the Sun boycott” if
they were born after 1972. The reason for choosing this
year as our cutoff is that these respondents were 16 or
younger at the time the Merseyside region decided to
boycott The Sun. We then use this dummy and interact
it with the Merseyside indicator, such that our treat-
ment group consists of respondents born after 1972 in
Merseyside. Table 3 reports our findings for “Sun”
readership and support for leaving the EU. Indeed,
for the models we estimate, we find a stronger effect
during the formative years. Respondents experiencing
their formative years during the boycott are signifi-
cantly less likely to read The Sun and to beEurosceptic.
This finding is even more telling if we keep in mind that
according to our data, respondents born after 1972 are
overall more likely to read The Sun and to be Euro-
sceptic outside of the Merseyside region. This further
underpins our previous findings and adds the perspec-
tive that the boycott indeed might shape political atti-
tudes in Merseyside, particularly for younger cohorts
born after the boycott.
Second, social class is an important predictor of
whether a respondent reads The Sun. Therefore, the
effects of the successful “Sun” boycott should be more
pronounced among working-class respondents, with
middle-class respondents (who were unlikely to read
The Sun in the first place) acting as an additional
control group within Merseyside.
We report our procedure in detail in Appendix A.15.
We find that before theHillsborough disaster, unskilled
and semiskilled workers were much more likely to read
The Sun than were skilled workers, persons in inter-
mediate occupations, or professionals. Therefore, we
should expect that the effect of The Sun boycott should
be most pronounced among unskilled and semiskilled
workers. Figure 5 reports the marginal effects of the
three-way interaction between the DiD estimand and
social class. We use three class indicators in our ana-
lysis: low (unemployed, unskilled, semiskilled),
medium (skilled), and high (intermediate and profes-
sional).15 The results of the DiDiD model vary as
expected across social classes—we observe a very large
and significant decrease of Euroscepticism for
unskilled and semiskilled working-class respondents,
whereas we estimate smaller effects for skilled workers
andmiddle-class respondents that were far less likely to
report reading The Sun before Hillsborough. Thus, the
decrease of Euroscepticism in Merseyside after the
Hillsborough disaster reported in the first part of our
analyses appears to be driven by working-class
respondents.
2016 Referendum
As outlined in our case description, The Sun played an
important role during the 2016 Brexit referendum
15 To ease interpretation of these findings, we rely here on a simpler
DiD strategy. We interact a Merseyside dummy with a post-
Hillsborough indicator and the social-class identifier instead of rely-
ing on a two-way fixed effects estimation on the constituency level as
outlined above. This allows us to plot the pre–post estimates separ-
ately forMerseyside and the rest of the country. The interpretation of
the findings remains unaffected by this simpler strategy.

























































































































campaign. Thus, in this section we look at the long-term
effects of Hillsborough on the 2016 EU referendum.
Figure 6 plots remain vote shares in the “Brexit”
referendum across England.
As shown in Figure 6, the city of Liverpool voted
significantly more “Remain” than did the rest of Eng-
land. In Table 4 we use the same DiD identification
strategy as in the previous analyses. We rely on a
counting-area-level dataset of referendum vote shares
in the 1975 EEC accession referendum and the 2016
Brexit referendum, which also includes time-invariant
and time-variant socioeconomic and political control
variables (Becker, Fetzer, and Novy 2017). As in all
previous analyses, we use other Northern English
counting areas as the control group. We code 2016 as
the post-Hillsborough period and 1975 as the pre-
TABLE 3. DiDiD Results: Effect of The Sun Boycott Conditional on Respondents’ Birth Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sun readership (0,1) Support leaving the EU (0,1)
Merseyside  born after 1972 -0.094 -0.080 -0.082 -0.085 -0.066 -0.065 -0.061 -0.060
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Constant 0.124 0.126 0.125 0.180 0.215 0.207 0.207 0.310
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.027)
Birth year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Study year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Obs 10,225 10,223 10,223 10,223 10,350 10,348 10,348 10,348
NConstituencies 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07
Adj. R2 (within) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02
RMSE 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39
Note: Period: 1985–2004. Standard errors clustered by constituency in parentheses. Controls: gender, education, religion, social class,
party-ID. Fixed effect estimates omitted from table.









































Note: The figure displays the CATEs stemming from a DiDiD specification interacting the standard DiD estimand with BSA respondents’
self-reported social class (unskilled working class served as the baseline): never had job, unskilled, skilled working class: partly skilled,
skilled, middle: intermediate, professionals). The point estimates are plotted (scatter) surrounded by 95% confidence intervals (whiskers).

























































































































Hillsborough period and again interact this variable
with the Merseyside treatment area indicator. We esti-
mate the following fixed effects model:
Leave2016i,t ¼ αi þ γt þ δDIDT i,t þ ζ
0X i þ εi,t , (3)
where Leave 2016i,t is the share of the “Leave” (2016)
or “No” (1975) vote in the EU referendums in counting
area i in year t, αi is a region or counting area fixed effect
(depending on specification) that rules out omitted-
variable bias from unobserved region/counting area
characteristics that are invariant over our study period,
γt is a fixed effect that accounts for common factors that
change between 1975 and 2016, X is a matrix of time-
variant counting area covariates collected in 2001 and
2011 by Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2017), Ti,t is our
binary treatment indicator (Merseyside in 2016 after
theHillsborough disaster), and εi,t is the error term. The
term δDID is the estimand of interest that identifies the
effect of Hillsborough on the Eurosceptic vote share in
Merseyside. We cluster our standard errors at the
counting-area level. All details about the data and
statistical analysis can be found in the Materials and
Methods section in Appendix A.16.
FIGURE 6. Remain Vote Share in the 2016 EU Referendum across England
TABLE 4. Difference-in-Differences: Effect of Hillsborough on 2016 Leave Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leave vote share
δ DiD -0.082 -0.083 -0.082 -0.088 -0.088
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026)
Constant 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.601 0.446
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.052) (0.051)
Merseyside FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Region FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Counting area FE ✓
Region  year FE ✓
Controls ✓ ✓
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Observations 102 102 102 102 102
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; model (5) uses bootstrapped standard errors. Omitted controls: shares of EUmigrants, A10 migrants,
non-EU migrants, financial sector employment, manufacturing sector employment, residents > 60, tertiary education, and median wage.

























































































































Table 4 shows that counting areas located in Mer-
seyside are consistently estimated to be around 8–9
percentage points less “Leave” voting in the 2016 EU
referendum than other Northern English counting
areas, compared with the 1975 referendum. This effect
is robust to the inclusion of time-variant control variables
related to EU/Non-EU migration as well as economic
and sociodemographic variables reflecting changes in
age and educational composition that are strongly
correlated with Brexit vote shares (Table 4, columns
4–5, and Table A.13 in the Appendix). These results
indicate that the consistently more pro-European atti-
tudes in Merseyside as a result of The Sun boycott also
translated into higher “Remain” vote shares in the
Brexit referendum.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Evidence from an exogenously induced boycott of the
most important Eurosceptic newspaper—The Sun—in
Merseyside as a consequence of the paper’s reporting
on the Hillsborough sporting disaster—caused a
decrease of Euroscepticism in Merseyside. Consistent
with our hypothesis that the decline in Euroscepticism
in Merseyside post-1989 was driven by The Sun boy-
cott, treatment effects are stronger among generations
that came politically of age during the boycott and
among unskilled and semiskilled workers, the social
group that was most likely to read The Sun before
Hillsborough. The effects we identify cannot be
explained by differential trends in party preferences
betweenMerseyside and other Northern English coun-
ties, nor are they likely to have resulted from differen-
tial access to EU structural funds or differential effects
of globalization on offshorability.
Therefore, our study makes an important contribu-
tion to our understanding of the long-term effects of
sustained media campaigns on public opinion. The
study of over-time processes and temporal dynamics
in media persuasion research is “in need of consider-
ably more theoretical and empirical attention” (Leeper
and Slothuus 2020), and instances that allow for such
study are rare. Besides our contribution to the over-
time study of media effects, we also address another
related challenge of research on the media and public
opinion—namely, that most studies can only look at the
effects of a specific article or news story rather than the
effects of an entire media campaign over an extended
period. As former Conservative Chancellor Michael
Heseltine said in a recent BBC interview speaking
about the Sun’s anti-EU campaign, “That drip drip drip
of European poison decade after decade had a most
unfortunate effect on British public opinion” (Roberts
2020). No matter where one stands on the normative
question, it is not inconceivable that as a discipline we
perceive media effects to be small because we usually
study small, one-off, interventions.
To what extent are the results generalizable to other
contexts beyond the Hillsborough case, given that our
estimates are local to Merseyside and the North of
England? While generalizability must ultimately
remain an empirical question, in this paper we clearly
outline the scope conditions that we think need to hold
for media campaigns to result in large and lasting
opinion change. In highly saturated and polarized cam-
paign environments (Kalla and Broockman 2018), on
highly salient issues, and where strong counterframes
are available (Chong and Druckman 2007), we would
expect the media to have minimal or, at best, small
effects. We would expect substantively large effects
where political contexts allow for sustained and one-
sided media coverage on emerging issues. Moreover,
we think that tabloid media outlets can be particularly
influential if they decide to take a stance on politics
because readers are likely to select into consumption
for entertainment purposes (Arceneaux and Johnson
2013). Thus, tabloids overcome the problem that those
individuals who should be most likely to receive per-
suasive content are least likely to change their mind
because they are highly attentive to politics in the first
place (Zaller 1992).
One counterfactual worth considering when think-
ing about the generalizability of our results is whether
The Sun boycott would have produced equally large
effects had it happened for instance in Hampshire, in
the South of England, as opposed to Merseyside, in
the North of England. One key question is whether
former “Sun” readers would have substituted their
media diets with equally Eurosceptic papers or
whether they would have followed Merseyside’s lead
on substituting a Eurosceptic with a pro-EU tabloid.
Because we think that substitution occurred based on
cultural, not political preferences (Rooney 2000), we
would expect that we should have seen similar effects
in places that have a similar class composition of
newspaper readership.
While instances that allow for the causal study of a
sustained one-sided media campaign are rare (Leeper
and Slothuus 2020), that does not mean that sustained
one-sided media campaigns are rare per se. Besides the
Murdoch-owned Eurosceptic tabloid press in the
United Kingdom, important cases that immediately
come to mind are the emergence of another Mur-
doch-owned medium, Fox News, in the United States
(DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007), Berlusconi-owned TV
channels in Italy (Mastrorocco and Minale 2018), an
Adelson-owned newspaper in Israel (Grossman, Mar-
galit, and Mitts 2020), and Blocher-owned newspapers
in Switzerland (Spirig 2020). These outlets all push
clear political agendas over a sustained period—they
raise the salience of specific issues and provide a strong
frame with which to interpret them. Whether these
“issue entrepreneurs” (de Vries and Hobolt 2020) are
ultimately successful also depends on whether other
actors engage in time and counter the frames provided.
As George Osborne, the former chancellor and one of
the key government figures in the “Remain” campaign
wrote in 2018, “We were too late in the day trying to
explain some of the benefits of EUmembership” (BBC
2018).
Beyond adding to our understanding ofmedia effects
on public opinion in general, what does this study tell us
about the rise of Euroscepticism and the 2016 Brexit

























































































































vote in particular? Although our main results focus on
the effects of the boycott on public opinion toward
leaving the EU, official counting area data from the
1975 and 2016 EU referendums also suggest that The
Sun boycott might have decreased the “Leave” vote
share in Merseyside in the 2016 EU referendum.
Because this auxiliary analysis covers a longer period,
we account for potential time-variant confounders
such as changes in education levels and EUmigration.
Combining the analysis of the public opinion data
spanning 30 years and the data on the referendum
votes in 1975 and 2016 in a DiD framework, our study
indicates that sustained media campaigns on emer-
ging issues can have large, lasting, and ultimately
consequential effects on public opinion and public
policy.
In addition to the well-researched economic and
social factors that have contributed to Eurosceptic
opinion and to the Brexit vote in 2016 (Becker, Fetzer,
and Novy 2017; de Vries 2018), we show that, at least in
part, public opinion and policy-relevant public deci-
sions were endogenous to tabloid media reporting.
While this result may not be counterintuitive or come
as a big surprise to those who follow British politics, it is
one thing to suspect that a causal relationship exists and
another to provide empirical evidence consistent with
this assumption. Moreover, our article shows that the
decline of Euroscepticism in Merseyside following The
Sun boycott largely reflects a decrease in Euroscepti-
cism among unskilled and semiskilled working-class
voters, who made up a large share of Sun readers
before the disaster. This finding is consistent with Ladd
and Lenz’s (2009) study of the effects of the Sun’s
endorsement switch from Conservatives to Labour at
the 1997 General Election, where persuasive effects
were also more pronounced among working-class
“Sun” readers. By documenting the role of the tabloid
media in affecting attitude change toward European
integration among working-class voters, we highlight
an important nonstructural factor that contributed to
the increase in Euroscepticism. This does notmean that
EU immigration, regional inequalities, or austerity did
not matter or that The Sun caused Brexit, but this study
provides evidence that the tabloid press played an
important role in shaping support for “Leave” among
working-class voters.
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